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1 That is 10% of the total amount of convertible debt
debt issued by US ﬁrms (excluding ﬁnancials and uti
Company New Issues database.
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While convertible offerings announced between 1984 and 1999 induce average abnormal stock returns of
1.69%, convertible announcement effects over the period 2000–2008 are more than twice as negative
(4.59%). We hypothesize that this evolution is attributable to a shift in the convertible bond investor
base from long-only investors towards convertible arbitrage funds. These funds buy convertibles and
short the underlying stocks, causing downward price pressure. Consistent with this hypothesis, we ﬁnd
that the differences in announcement returns between the Traditional Investor period (1984–1999) and
the Arbitrage period (2000–September 2008) disappear when controlling for arbitrage-induced short
selling associated with a range of hedging strategies. Post-issuance stock returns are also in line with
the arbitrage explanation. Average announcement effects of convertibles issued during the Global Finan-
cial Crisis are even more negative (9.12%), due to a combination of short-selling price pressure and
issuer, issue, and macroeconomic characteristics associated with these offerings.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Convertible bonds are hybrid securities that combine features of
straight debt and equity. They resemble straight debt by paying a
ﬁxed coupon rate, and they resemble common equity by offering
the possibility of conversion into stock as an alternative for receiv-
ing the nominal value in cash at the redemption date. Convertibles
are a popular source of ﬁnancing. Over the past 30 years, convert-
ible debt issuance comprised approximately 10% of total securities
issuance by US corporations.1
This paper is inspired by the observation that stock returns
around convertible bond announcements have sharply declined
over the past decade, whereas there is no corresponding decline
in seasoned equity or straight debt announcement returns. While
convertible offerings announced between 1984 and 1999 induce
average abnormal stock returns of 1.69%, convertibles announced+34 915933111.
, marie.dutordoir@mbs.ac.uk
eld), p.verwijmeren@vu.nl
, seasoned equity, and straight
lities). Source: Securities Data
Y license.in the period 2000–2008 are associated with average abnormal
stock price declines that are more than twice as large (4.59%).
We hypothesize that the sharp decline in observed convertible
bond announcement effects is attributable to a substantial change
in the buy-side of the convertible bond market. Convertibles tradi-
tionally appealed to long-only investors looking for diversiﬁcation
beneﬁts and indirect participation in equity (Lummer and Riepe,
1993). However, Choi et al. (2009) show a dramatic increase in
the importance of convertible arbitrage funds since the end of
the 1990s. To exploit underpriced convertible issues, convertible
arbitrageurs buy convertible debt and short the underlying com-
mon stock. If demand curves for stock are downward-sloping, the
supply increase associated with this arbitrage-related short selling
should result in a negative stock price effect around the convertible
bond issue date. Most recent convertibles are placed very quickly,
resulting in a very short time span (one trading day or less) be-
tween announcement and issuance. Our key prediction is therefore
that the observed highly negative ‘‘announcement’’ effects of
recent convertible bond issues may partly reﬂect temporary price
pressure associated with arbitrage-induced short selling upon
convertible bond issuance.
To test this prediction, we collect a sample of 1436 convertible
bonds issued by US corporations from the Securities Data
2 See Eckbo et al. (2007) for an overview of event studies on security offering
announcement returns.
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previous studies (Choi et al., 2009; De Jong et al., 2011), we con-
struct a measure for the amount of hedging-induced short selling
associated with each convertible bond offering by regressing
changes in monthly short interest around convertible bond issues
on a number of potential issuer-speciﬁc, issue-speciﬁc, and time-
varying determinants of arbitrageurs’ interest in a given offering.
The predicted value of this regression reﬂects the portion of the
change in monthly short interest that can be attributed to short
selling by convertible arbitrageurs, as opposed to short selling by
fundamental traders.
In line with our hypothesis, we ﬁnd that the difference in
announcement-period stock returns between convertibles issued
in the period 1984–1999 (labeled ‘‘Traditional Investor period’’)
and convertibles issued in the period 2000–September 2008 (la-
beled ‘‘Arbitrage period’’) is no longer signiﬁcant after controlling
for our constructed measure for arbitrage-induced short selling.
Our ﬁndings are robust to assuming different convertible arbitrage
strategies (delta-neutral, bullish gamma, and bearish gamma hedg-
ing). Our analysis controls for a wide range of issuer-speciﬁc, issue-
speciﬁc, and macroeconomic determinants of convertible bond
announcement effects.
The Global Financial Crisis sparked a sharp contraction in the
convertible arbitrage hedge fund industry. Masters (2009) writes:
‘‘Now hedge funds play a much smaller role in the investor base, rep-
resenting less than half of the buyers of new issues (of convertible
bonds) in many cases.’’ To the extent that this shift in the investor
base results in less short selling, we expect to observe less negative
abnormal announcement returns for convertibles issued during the
Crisis. However, our event study results indicate that average stock
returns around the announcements of convertible bonds issued be-
tween the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008 and
December 2009 are almost twice as negative as in the Arbitrage
period (9.12%). Our evidence suggests that the highly negative
announcement effects of Post-Lehman convertibles can be attrib-
uted to short-selling price pressure from the remaining convertible
arbitrage funds in the market, as well as to offering and market
characteristics that negatively affect announcement returns (high
issuer and market volatility, and severe offering underpricing).
To further strengthen our case for the arbitrage explanation for
the evolution in convertible bond announcement effects, we also
analyze post-issuance abnormal stock returns. Since arbitrage-in-
duced short selling does not result from fundamental news about
the stock, we expect a reversal of the negative stock price impact
of arbitrage-related short selling once the market has absorbed
the additional supply of shares. Consistent with this prediction,
we ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive abnormal stock returns following Arbi-
trage-period convertible bond issues, with the magnitude of the
reversal signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by our constructed measure for
the arbitrage demand associated with these offerings. In contrast,
we ﬁnd no evidence of such reversal for issues made during peri-
ods with lower arbitrage fund involvement in convertible bond
issues.
Our analysis contributes to the following three stands of litera-
ture. First, we complement event studies on stock returns around
convertible debt announcements. A common ﬁnding of these stud-
ies is that convertibles induce negative abnormal stock returns
intermediate in size between the announcement effects associated
with seasoned equity and straight debt offerings (Dann and
Mikkelson, 1984; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Lewis et al., 1999).
This pattern is consistent with the signaling model of Myers and
Majluf (1984), which predicts that relatively more equity-like
security offerings are more likely to be perceived as a signal of ﬁrm
overvaluation. Our study sheds new light on these stylized facts by
documenting that announcement-period stock returns associated
with post-2000 convertible offerings are far more negative thanthose for equity offerings made over the same period. However,
we also show that part of the highly negative ‘‘announcement’’ re-
turn associated with recent convertible bond offerings is actually
caused by short-lived stock price pressure induced by short-selling
activities of convertible bond buyers. Our results imply that event
studies using recent convertible bond offering announcements
should correct for the inﬂuence of buy-side short selling associated
with announced convertible bond issues. If not, they are likely to
draw overly pessimistic conclusions on the true magnitude of the
transactions’ impact on ﬁrm value.
Second, our study contributes to a recent stream of corporate ﬁ-
nance articles that explicitly take the inﬂuence of investor charac-
teristics into account. As pointed out by Baker (2009), corporate
ﬁnance studies have traditionally focused on the corporate supply
side, thereby implicitly considering the investor side as a black box
with perfectly elastic and competitive demand. However, a num-
ber of studies ﬁnd that corporate ﬁnance actions can also be inﬂu-
enced through investor demand channels (e.g., Faulkender and
Petersen, 2006; Leary, 2009; Lemmon and Roberts, 2010). Within
this stream of literature, a limited number of papers document
the impact of the actions of convertible arbitrageurs on convertible
issuance volumes (Choi et al., 2010; De Jong et al., 2010) and con-
vertible bond design (Brown et al., 2010; De Jong et al., 2011). Our
study complements these papers by examining the impact of
buy-side shifts on the stock returns around convertible bond
announcements.
Third, our paper complements a number of studies on the per-
formance of convertible arbitrage strategies (Fabozzi et al., 2009;
Agarwal et al., 2010; Hutchinson and Gallagher, 2010). While these
articles focus on portfolio returns realized by convertible arbitrage
funds over the years following issuance, our key goal is to analyze to
what extent the short-selling transactions of convertible arbitrag-
eurs affect issuer stock returns around convertible bond issuance.
We ﬁnd that post-issuance changes in required short-selling posi-
tions are very small and therefore unlikely to provoke strong issuer
stock price reactions beyond the issue date, even with daily rebal-
ancing of arbitrage portfolios.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next
section provides the theoretical background for our study. Section
3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 discusses the
empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.2. Theoretical background
2.1. Shifts in the convertible bond investor base
Theoretical studies on convertible debt predict that convertibles
are able to mitigate costs associated with attracting common equi-
ty or straight debt ﬁnancing (Green, 1984; Brennan and Schwartz,
1988; Stein, 1992). Consistent with the hybrid debt-equity nature
of convertible debt, event studies on the stock returns around con-
vertible debt announcements commonly ﬁnd that these returns are
negative and intermediate in size between the announcement ef-
fects associated with seasoned equity and straight debt offerings.2
The majority of these studies focus on a period in which convertible
bond investors (such as mutual funds specialized in convertible bond
investments) buy the convertibles without shorting the underlying
stock. However, around the year 2000 the convertible bond investor
base shifted from traditional long-only buyers towards convertible
arbitrageurs (mostly hedge funds, but also institutional investors).
By the beginning of the 21st century, hedge funds were purchasing
up to 80% of new convertible issues (Brown et al., 2010). The recent
0100
200
300
400
500
600
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f a
rt
ic
le
s 
in
 
Fa
ct
iv
a
Fig. 1. Quarterly number of convertible arbitrage-related articles appearing in the Factiva database. This ﬁgure shows the number of news sources (articles or press releases)
containing any of the terms ‘‘convertible arbitrage’’, ‘‘convertible debt arbitrage’’, ‘‘convertible bond arbitrage’’, ‘‘convertible arbitrageur’’, ‘‘convertible debt arbitrageur’’,
‘‘convertible bond arbitrageur’’, ‘‘convertible arbitrageurs’’, ‘‘convertible debt arbitrageurs’’, or ‘‘convertible bond arbitrageurs’’ in Factiva in any given quarter over the period
1984–2009. To avoid double-counting, we exclude instances where the same article appears more than once.
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importance of convertible arbitrageurs driven by negative perfor-
mance, heavy redemptions, and severe reductions in inﬂows (Credit
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index Research Report, 2009; Hutchinson and
Gallagher, 2010; Steinbrugge, 2011).
The main goal of this paper is to examine the impact of these
two important shifts in the involvement of convertible arbitrage
funds on issuer stock returns around convertible bond offerings.
We distinguish three periods, each with a different involvement
of convertible arbitrageurs. It is difﬁcult to pinpoint the exact mo-
ment when convertible arbitrageurs became dominant players in
the convertible bond market, because hedge funds do not disclose
much information on their investments. To obtain more insight
into the evolution of convertible arbitrage funds over time, we
search the Factiva database for news sources that mention ‘‘con-
vertible arbitrage’’ or related terms over the period 1984–2009.3
Fig. 1 provides the results of this search. The graph shows a sharp
rise in the number of hits from 2000 onwards. This result is in line
with Choi et al. (2009), who document a dramatic increase in the to-
tal assets under management of convertible bond hedge funds at the
end of the 1990s.4 We therefore use January 2000 as a cutoff date for
the start of the Arbitrage period, in which the convertible bond
investor base is dominated by convertible arbitrageurs, and label
the previous window (from 1984 to December 1999) the Traditional
Investor period.
As argued by Beber and Pagano (forthcoming), the Lehman
Brothers collapse on September 15, 2008 is one of the most salient
turning points in the course of events leading to the crisis. We
therefore consider this date as the start of the third period, labeled
the ‘‘Post-Lehman’’ period.3 Factiva provides access to thousands of archived newspaper and magazine
articles, as well as to press releases appearing on newswires.
4 A Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index research report dated May 2009 conﬁrms
that January 2000 is a reasonable cutoff date for the start of the Arbitrage period: ‘‘Up
until the year 2000, the convertible bond market was primarily driven by long-only
buyers. Hedge funds entered the space in increasing numbers thereafter (. . .). The hedge
fund inﬂux represented a change in the buyer base.’’2.2. Testable predictions
Unlike traditional long-only investors, convertible arbitrageurs
generally short a portion of the convertible debt issuer’s stock to
make their position invariant to small stock price movements.
Their proﬁts result from the fact that convertibles tend to be
underpriced at issuance, and from their ability to exploit superior
technology in managing convertible risk. Potential reasons for con-
vertible debt underpricing include illiquidity, small issue size, and
complexities associated with the valuation of hybrid securities
(Lhabitant, 2002).
If demand curves for stock are not perfectly elastic, the increase
in the supply of shares resulting from arbitrage-related short sell-
ing should induce downward stock price pressure around the con-
vertible bond issue date. A number of studies effectively ﬁnd
evidence of negative abnormal stock returns around convertible
bond issue dates (Arshanapalli et al., 2005; Loncarski et al., 2009;
De Jong et al., 2011).
Arguably, arbitrageurs should establish their short positions on
convertible bond issue dates rather than on announcement dates.
However, almost all recent convertible bond offerings take place
within one trading day of the announcement date. The most
important reason for this rapid placement is that most recent
convertibles are structured as Rule 144A offerings. Such offerings
can be sold to selected institutional investors without having to in-
cur time-consuming activities such as road shows and Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) ﬁlings. As a result of the overlap
between issuance and announcement dates, the observed
‘‘announcement’’ effect of convertible bond issues may reﬂect price
pressure associated with the shorting activities of convertible
arbitrageurs. Given the different levels of involvement of this
investor class over the three periods considered in our study, we
obtain the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Arbitrage-period convertibles induce more negative
announcement-period stock returns than Traditional Investor- and
Post-Lehman-period convertibles.
Stockmarket reactions to convertible bond announcementsmay
be inﬂuenced by issuer characteristics, issue characteristics, and
macroeconomic conditions (Lewis et al., 1999, 2003; Dutordoir
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et al., 2008). Any observed difference in the stockholder wealth ef-
fects of convertible bond offerings across the three periodsmay thus
be caused by intertemporal changes in these determinants. We
establish whether the differences in convertible debt announce-
ment returns across the three periods are effectively causedby shifts
in buy-side characteristics by testing the following prediction:
Hypothesis 2. Differences in announcement-period stock returns
between Arbitrage-, Traditional Investor-, and Post-Lehman-period
convertibles disappear when controlling for arbitrage-related short
selling associated with the convertible debt offering.
If demand curves are only inelastic in the short run, stock prices
should revert to their fundamental values once the market has ab-
sorbed the supply shock caused by arbitrage-related short selling.
Given that convertibles issued in the Arbitrage period are likely
to provoke more arbitrage-induced price pressure, we expect to
observe stronger positive stock price reversals for these issues
compared with offerings made during the Traditional Investor or
Post-Lehman periods. We thus obtain the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Arbitrage-period convertible offerings are followed by
a stronger positive stock price reversal than Traditional Investor- and
Post-Lehman-period convertibles.5 Mitchell et al. (2004) apply a similar procedure to isolate the portion of changes in
short interest attributable to the hedging behavior of merger arbitrageurs.
6 Fabozzi et al. (2009) also consider a range of other strategies followed by
arbitrage funds. For example, funds can engage in convergence hedge strategies in
which they exploit pricing differentials between options and convertibles with the
same underlying stock, or between different convertible bonds. For the purpose of our
analysis, only hedging strategies involving short selling of the issuer’s stock are
relevant.3. Data and methodology
3.1. Convertible bond, seasoned equity, and straight debt samples
We obtain data for US convertible debt, seasoned equity, and
straight debt offerings made between January 1984 and December
2009 from the SDC database. We exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900–
4999) and ﬁnancial ﬁrms (SIC codes 6000–6999), and consolidate
multiple tranches of convertibles and straight debt offerings issued
by the same ﬁrm on the same date. In the convertible debt sample,
we only include plain vanilla convertible bonds (no exchangeable
bonds, mandatory convertible bonds, or convertible preferred
stock). In the equity sample, we only include seasoned common
stock offerings made by the ﬁrm itself (no IPOs, no offerings made
by existing shareholders, no preferred stock issues, no unit issues).
We eliminate asset- and mortgage-backed bonds, depository notes,
and bonds issued with warrants from the straight debt sample. We
thus obtain a data set of 1436 convertible debt issues, 4885 sea-
soned equity issues, and 8734 straight debt issues. The Traditional
Investor period accounts for 727 issues, the Arbitrage period for
645 issues, and the Post-Lehman period for 64 issues.
We obtain balance sheet and income statement variables from
the Compustat Fundamentals Annual database, stock price-related
data (i.e., prices, shares outstanding, and trading volumes) from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), issue-speciﬁc infor-
mation from SDC, and macroeconomic data from Datastream.
3.2. Measure for arbitrage-related short selling
To test the arbitrage explanation for differences in convertible
debt announcement returns across the three periods, we construct
a measure for the amount of arbitrage-related short selling associ-
ated with each convertible bond offering. In a ﬁrst step, we down-
load monthly short interest data from the Securities Monthly ﬁle of
the CRSP-Compustat merged database. These data are available
from March 2003 until June 2008. To match short interest data
to convertible bond issues, we apply the algorithm used by Bech-
mann (2004) and Choi et al. (2009). If a bond is issued before the
cutoff trade date of a given month (three trading days prior tothe 15th of each month), we match the issue date with the short
interest data ﬁled for that month. Otherwise, we match the issue
date with the short interest data for the following month. As short
interest is reported bi-monthly since September 2007, we adjust
the algorithm to a two-monthly frequency from that month on-
wards. We scale the change in monthly short interest (DSI) by
the number of shares outstanding (SO) measured on trading day
20 relative to the announcement date. We ﬁnd an average (med-
ian) value of 0.019 (0.014) for the DSI/SO ratio, which is similar to
values recorded by Choi et al. (2009) and De Jong et al. (2011).
As argued by Choi et al. (2009), part of the observed increase in
short interest around convertible bond offerings may be attribut-
able to the short-selling actions of fundamental traders. In a second
step, we therefore isolate the portion of the DSI/SO measure that
can effectively be attributed to short selling by convertible arbit-
rageurs by regressingDSI/SO on potential determinants of convert-
ible arbitrageurs’ interest in that particular convertible offering.
We take the predicted value of this regression for each convertible
bond issue as a measure for the change in short interest caused by
arbitrage-related short selling for that convertible bond.5
We expect convertible arbitrageurs to be more interested in
issuers with more liquid shares (since high liquidity makes it easier
for them to obtain their hedging positions), with no dividend pay-
outs (since dividends represent a cash outﬂow for short sellers),
with higher institutional ownership (since institutional investors
are more likely to lend out their shares than individual investors),
and with more volatile stock returns (since volatility positively
affects the option value of the convertible, thus allowing a higher
potential proﬁt). We therefore consider the Amihud (2002) mea-
sure for illiquidity, a dummy variable equal to one for convertible
debt issuers that paid out a dividend in the previous ﬁscal year, the
percentage of institutional ownership (obtained from Thomson
Reuters), and the issuer’s stock return volatility as potential is-
suer-speciﬁc determinants of the arbitrage demand for convertible
debt offerings. Appendix A contains detailed deﬁnitions of all
explanatory variables included in this paper.
In addition, we expect arbitrageurs’ interest in a convertible
bond issue to be affected by the characteristics of the offering itself.
We predict a larger increase in arbitrage-related short interest
around offerings for which arbitrageurs need to short-sell a larger
number of shares to hedge their positions. We therefore include
the ratio of DeltaNeutral to shares outstanding (SO), with Delta-
Neutral representing the expected number of shares shorted by
arbitrageurs following a delta-neutral hedging strategy. Appendix
B provides a detailed deﬁnition of this variable. Although delta-
neutral hedging represents the ‘‘bread-and-butter’’ strategy of
convertible arbitrageurs (Calamos, 2003), arbitrage funds may also
follow directional hedging strategies in which they short sell
slightly more or less than what would be required under a delta-
neutral hedge (Calamos, 2003; Fabozzi et al., 2009).6 Consistent
with Fabozzi et al. (2009), we deﬁne GammaBear (GammaBull) as
the number of shares expected to be shorted under a bearish (bull-
ish) gamma hedging strategy in which arbitrageurs short sell delta
plus (minus) 0.09 at issuance. The bearish gamma hedge yields a
small proﬁt when stock prices decrease, and the bullish gamma
hedge yields a small proﬁt when stock prices increase. Appendix B
provides detailed deﬁnitions for these variables. We also expect
arbitrageurs’ interest to be positively inﬂuenced by the convertible
8 As argued by Calamos (2003), hedge fund consultants generally consider anything
ore than a very mild deviation from the delta required for delta-neutral hedging
appropriate for a convertible arbitrage portfolio.
9 Findings remain similar when we use the coefﬁcients in Column (2) for this
urpose. The reason why we use Column (1) is that CAFactiva is available over the
ntire sample period, while CAFlows is only available from 1994 onwards.
0 This prediction might seem at odds with the convertible debt rationale of Stein
992), which states that convertibles can be used as tools to mitigate equity-related
dverse selection costs. However, even though convertibles entail smaller equity-
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the sensitivity of the convertible’s delta with respect to changes in
the underlying stock price. A convertible with a high gamma offers
dynamic hedging opportunities more frequently, thus allowing the
possibility of higher returns (Calamos, 2003). Finally, we expect
arbitrageurs to be more interested in zero-coupon convertibles.
The reason is that paying no coupons makes it easier to separate
the option component of the convertible from its ﬁxed-income com-
ponent, which is a technique often applied by convertible arbitrage
hedge funds.
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these po-
tential issuer- and issue-speciﬁc hedging demand determinants
for the three periods.
Kruskal–Wallis p-values indicate the joint signiﬁcance level of
the differences in each variable across the three periods. In the ﬁnal
column, we report the results of t-tests for pairwise differences in
the means across two periods. The letters a (b) indicate signiﬁcant
differences (at the 5% signiﬁcance level or lower) in the mean value
between the Traditional Investor and the Arbitrage (Post-Lehman)
periods, and the letter c indicates a signiﬁcant difference (at the 5%
signiﬁcance level or lower) in the mean value between the Arbi-
trage and the Post-Lehman periods.
We ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant differences in arbitrage demand
determinants across the three periods. Most remarkably, the per-
centage of institutional ownership of convertible debt issuers in-
creases substantially between the Traditional Investor and the
Arbitrage periods (from 41% to 72%), and stock return volatility is
almost twice as large for Post-Lehman issuers than for other issu-
ers. Convertible bond gammas increase signiﬁcantly over the sam-
ple period, from an average of 0.005 in the Traditional Investor
period to an average of 0.014 in the Post-Lehman period.7 While
approximately 7% of the convertibles issued during the ﬁrst two
periods have a zero-coupon structure, we ﬁnd no zero-coupon offer-
ings in the Post-Lehman period.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the results of a regression analysis of
DSI/SO on the potential determinants of arbitrage-related short
selling. The analysis includes convertibles issued between 2003
and 2008 for which all necessary explanatory variables are avail-
able. In all regressions reported throughout the paper, we calculate
t-statistics using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors.
Next to including issuer- and issue-speciﬁc features, the re-
ported regressions also control for temporal variations in the cap-
ital supply from convertible arbitrageurs. As a ﬁrst proxy for
ﬂuctuations in the importance of convertible arbitrageurs as an
investor class, we count the number of news sources in Factiva that
mention ‘‘convertible arbitrage’’ or a related term over the 3
months prior to issuance (CAFactiva). One limitation of this mea-
sure is that it does not distinguish between positive and negative
developments affecting the capital supply of convertible arbitrag-
eurs (i.e., it abstracts from the speciﬁc content of the news
sources). We therefore consider lagged capital ﬂows into convert-
ible arbitrage funds (CAFlows) over the quarter prior to issuance
as an alternative proxy for temporal ﬂuctuations in the importance
of hedge funds as an investor class. Appendix A provides a detailed
description of the calculation of this variable. The CAFlows variable
may be a more accurate measure than CAFactiva, but presents the
disadvantage that it can only be obtained from 1994 onwards.
The R2s of the regression speciﬁcations indicate that the arbi-
trage demand proxies are able to explain approximately 20% of
the variation in short interest increases around convertible bond7 The gammas of the convertibles in our data set are quite small. This ﬁnding can be
attributed to the fact that we measure gamma on the convertible debt issue date,
when most convertibles are still relatively far out of the money. Gamma tends to be
highest for at the money convertibles (Calamos, 2003).offerings. This result is consistent with the notion that part of the
increase in short interest reﬂects trading patterns by fundamental
traders rather than arbitrageurs.
In Columns (1) and (2), we assume that the arbitrageurs follow
a delta-neutral hedging strategy. Column (1) includes CAFactiva
and Column (2) includes CAFlows, which is only available for 330
observations. In line with our predictions, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
negative impact of the Amihud illiquidity measure (both columns),
and a signiﬁcant positive impact of the percentage of institutional
ownership (Column (1)) and of the required amount of shares to be
shorted, measured as DeltaNeutral/SO (both columns), on DSI/SO.
None of the other variables has a signiﬁcant impact. In Column
(3), we replicate the analysis in Column (1) but assume that arbit-
rageurs adopt a bearish gamma hedging strategy. We ﬁnd that
GammaBear/SO has a highly signiﬁcant positive impact with a
coefﬁcient size similar to that of DeltaNeutral/SO, with the other
regression results remaining largely unaltered. As can be seen from
Column (4), a similar conclusion holds when we assume that arbit-
rageurs follow a bullish gamma hedging strategy. Our results thus
seem very robust to alternative hedging strategies. This conclusion
is not surprising, as the gamma hedging strategies involve only
mild deviations from delta-neutral hedging, resulting in very high
pairwise correlations (over 0.90) between the DeltaNeutral, Gam-
maBear and GammaBull measures.8
In a ﬁnal step, we use the coefﬁcients of the regression in Col-
umn (1) of Table 1 to obtain an estimate of the arbitrage-related
change in short interest for each convertible debt offering made
over the period 1984–2009. That is, for each observation for which
we have all explanatory variables available, we multiply the value
of the regression coefﬁcients by the values of the correspondent
explanatory variables. The resulting value, labeled ArbDemand/
SO, represents the estimated change in short interest relative to
shares outstanding caused by convertible arbitrageurs’ short sell-
ing associated with that particular convertible bond.9
3.3. Control variables
Next to our hedging demand measure, we include a number of
issuer-speciﬁc variables in our analysis of convertible bond
announcement stock returns. Appendix A provides a detailed deﬁ-
nition of each of the control variables. All issuer characteristics
included in the regression analyses are measured at the ﬁscal
year-end preceding the convertible debt announcement date, un-
less otherwise indicated.
Since convertibles encompass an equity component, we expect
stockholder reactions to convertible debt announcements to be
more negative for issuers with high equity-related ﬁnancing costs.
Similarly, due to the debt component embedded in convertible
debt, we also expect convertible debt announcement stock returns
to be more negative for issuers with high costs of attracting new
debt ﬁnancing.10 In line with Lewis et al. (1999, 2003), we use the
amount of slack capital and the pre-announcement stock runup aslated ﬁnancing costs than equity offerings, their equity component still induces an
cremental increase in the level of equity-related costs of the issuing ﬁrm. Thus,
ithin a convertible debt sample, we expect stockholder reactions to be more
egative for issuers with high equity-related ﬁnancing costs. An analogous reasoning
pplies for the impact of debt-related ﬁnancing costs on convertible debt announce-
ent returns.m
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Table 1
Determinants of changes in short interest around convertible bond issuance.
Variable Traditional Investor period (N = 727) Arbitrage period (N = 645) Post-Lehman period (N = 64) Kruskal–Wallis p-value Signiﬁcance of difference in means
Average Median Std. Dev. Average Median Std. Dev. Average Median Std. Dev.
Panel A: Summary statistics for issuer- and issue-speciﬁc determinants of arbitrage-related short selling
Amihud 0.260 0.029 1.395 0.013 0.002 0.040 0.159 0.024 0.703 0.000 a,b,c
DividendPaying 37.451% 20.411% 25.609% a
InstitOwnership 0.414 0.406 0.229 0.715 0.752 0.217 0.754 0.808 0.231 0.000 a,b
Volatility 0.443 0.405 0.173 0.551 0.491 0.247 1.063 0.994 0.593 0.000 a,b,c
DeltaNeutral/SO 0.160 0.129 0.130 0.105 0.092 0.069 0.133 0.116 0.083 0.000 a,b,c
GammaBear/SO 0.177 0.143 0.142 0.117 0.104 0.069 0.148 0.131 0.091 0.000 a,b,c
GammaBull/SO 0.142 0.115 0.117 0.093 0.082 0.062 0.118 0.101 0.076 0.000 a,b,c
Gamma 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.011 0.014 0.008 0.016 0.000 a,b,c
ZeroCoupon 7.290% 7.878% 0.000% b,c
Parameter estimate (t-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: Regression analysis of DSI/SO on potential
determinants of arbitrage-related short selling
Amihud 0.012** 0.020* 0.012** 0.020**
(2.03) (1.89) (2.03) (2.04)
DividendPaying 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
(1.30) (0.94) (1.44) (1.19)
InstitOwnership 0.009* 0.001 0.009* 0.008
(1.66) (0.21) (1.69) (1.64)
Volatility 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.006
(1.26) (0.39) (1.30) (1.23)
DeltaNeutral/SO 0.143*** 0.138***
(8.54) (7.50)
GammaBear/SO 0.159***
(8.42)
GammaBull/SO 0.131***
(8.63)
Gamma 0.127 0.050 0.137 0.118
(1.33) (0.47) (1.44) (1.24)
ZeroCoupon 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05)
CAFactiva 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.39) (1.39) (1.39)
CAFlows 0.005
(0.35)
Intercept 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.002
(0.36) (0.04) (0.38) (0.35)
Adj. R2 19.82% 18.98% 19.46% 20.08%
R2 21.31% 20.96% 20.95% 21.56%
N 440 330 440 440
Period 2003–2008 2003–2008 2003–2008 2003–2008
Panel A shows summary statistics for potential determinants of arbitrage-related short selling associated with a convertible bond offering. Variables are deﬁned as outlined in Appendix A and B. The Traditional Investor period
ranges from 1/1/1984 to 31/12/1999 and refers to the period before the surge in convertible arbitrage hedge funds. The Arbitrage period ranges from 1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008 and refers to the period when convertible arbitrageurs
were the predominant purchasers of convertible debt issues. The Post-Lehman period ranges from 15/9/2008 to 31/12/2009 and refers to the period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. We use a Kruskal–Wallis test to
jointly examine the differences in each issuer- and issue-speciﬁc characteristic between all three sub-periods. In the last column, the letter ‘‘a’’ indicates a signiﬁcant difference between the Traditional Investor period and the
Arbitrage period, ‘‘b’’ indicates a signiﬁcant difference between the Traditional Investor period and the Post-Lehman period, and ‘‘c’’ indicates a signiﬁcant difference between the Arbitrage period and the Post-Lehman period. We
use an independent sample t-test (assuming unequal variances) to examine the equality of means across any two sub-periods for continuous variables, and a v2-test to examine the equality of proportions across any two sub-
periods for dummy variables (i.e., DividendPaying and ZeroCoupon). Panel B presents the results of an OLS regression analysis over the period 01/01/2003 to 14/09/2008. The dependent variable DSI/SO is the change in monthly
short interest divided by shares outstanding over the month around the issue date. t-statistics, calculated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in parentheses.
N denotes the number of observations.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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cient slack capital or a high stock runup issues equity, stockholders
are more likely to infer that this ﬁrm is overvalued. We thus expect
both the slack capital and the pre-announcement stock runup to
have a negative impact on stockholder reactions to convertible debt
announcements. To capture debt-related ﬁnancing costs, we include
the ratio of taxes paid to total assets and the ratio of long-term debt
to total assets. In the ﬁnance literature, it is generally assumed that
ﬁrms with a higher leverage ratio and a lower tax ratio face higher
costs of attracting new debt ﬁnancing (see, e.g., Lewis et al., 1999,
2003). Next to these speciﬁc equity- and debt-related costs mea-
sures, we also include four control variables that act as proxies for
both equity- and debt-related ﬁnancing costs. The volatility of the
ﬁrm’s stock expressed relative to the volatility on the S&P 500 index
measures the level of asymmetric information associated with the
ﬁrm, as well as the ﬁrm’s riskiness. The market-to-book ratio may
act as a proxy for growth opportunities (and as such be negatively
associated with ﬁnancing costs), but may also measure the potential
for underinvestment and asymmetric information. Its predicted im-
pact is therefore unclear. Lastly, we include the ratio of ﬁxed assets
to total assets and the natural logarithm of total assets. Firms with a
high proportion of ﬁxed assets and/or a large size tend to have lower
levels of asymmetric information relating to their value and risk,
resulting in smaller equity- and debt-related ﬁnancing costs
(MacKie-Mason, 1990).
We also control for a number of issue-speciﬁc characteristics.
We include the offering’s credit rating (transformed into a numer-
ical measure as outlined in Appendix A). Higher CreditRating val-
ues imply worse credit ratings, and therefore a higher credit risk
associated with the offering. We also include the ratio of offering
proceeds to total assets, since Krasker (1986) predicts that rela-
tively larger equity(-linked) security offerings should result in
more negative announcement stock returns. Following Myers and
Majluf (1984), we expect relatively more equity-like convertibles
to induce more negative stockholder wealth effects. To capture
the convertible bond’s equity component size, we include the con-
version premium and the convertible bond maturity. Bonds with a
larger (smaller) conversion premium (maturity) are assumed to be
less equity-like. We obtain similar results when we replace the
conversion premium and the maturity by the convertible debt del-
ta, which acts as an umbrella measure of the convertible bond
equity component size.11 We also include a 144A dummy variable
to disentangle the effect of the Rule 144A private placement of con-
vertibles from the effect of hedging-induced short selling, and an
Issue = Announcement dummy variable equal to one for convertibles
for which the issue date coincides with the announcement date or
falls on the trading day after the announcement date. Convertibles
for which this is the case are expected to be associated with more
negative announcement returns, since their announcement-period
stock returns are more likely to capture hedging-induced price pres-
sure. We also control for convertible bond underpricing at issuance
(calculated as outlined in Appendix C). Offerings with higher initial
underpricing should be received less favorably by the market, since
they imply a wealth transfer from existing stockholders to convert-
ible bondholders.
Finally, we include a number of standard macroeconomic vari-
ables suggested by the literature, i.e., interest rates, term spreads,
market runups, and market return volatilities. In the regressions,
all macroeconomic determinants are lagged one quarter. Following
a similar reasoning as for the issuer-speciﬁc variables, we expect11 Detailed results of all untabulated robustness checks mentioned in the paper are
available on demand.stock price reactions to convertible debt announcements to be neg-
atively inﬂuenced by proxies for economy-wide ﬁnancing costs.
We thus predict a negative impact of interest rates, term spreads,
and market return volatilities, since these variables act as proxies
for the level of debt-related ﬁnancing costs in the economy as a
whole (Choe et al., 1993; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Krishnaswami
and Yaman, 2008). In turn, we expect a positive impact of market
returns, since ﬁnancing costs are assumed to be lower during mar-
ket booms (Choe et al., 1993). Table 2 provides descriptive statis-
tics for these control variables, and compares their average
values across the three periods.
The univariate test results indicate that Arbitrage-period issu-
ers have a signiﬁcantly larger slack and market-to-book ratio,
and signiﬁcantly smaller tax payments, relative stock return vola-
tility, ﬁxed assets, and total assets, than Traditional Investor-peri-
od issuers. With the exception of the ﬁnding on stock return
volatility, these results suggest that ﬁrms issuing convertibles dur-
ing the Arbitrage period face higher external ﬁnancing costs than
pre-2000 issuers. Post-Lehman issuers also differ from those in
the other periods on several dimensions, but the results do not
provide a clear picture on the relative magnitude of their ﬁnancing
costs. On the one hand Post-Lehman issuers tend to have lower tax
levels and higher debt levels, suggesting higher debt-related
ﬁnancing costs; on the other hand they tend to have a larger ﬁrm
size, suggesting lower costs of attracting external ﬁnancing. They
also have lower market-to-book ratios than issuers in preceding
periods.
We also uncover signiﬁcant differences in almost all issue-spe-
ciﬁc characteristics across the three windows. Convertible bond
offerings have signiﬁcantly better credit ratings towards the end
of the research period, as reﬂected in smaller CreditRating values.
Consistent with Fabozzi et al. (2009), we ﬁnd an increase in con-
version premia after the year 2000, but conversion premia de-
crease again during the Post-Lehman period. In line with Huang
and Ramirez (2010), we ﬁnd that the percentage of convertibles is-
sued under Rule 144A increases dramatically as of the year 2000.
While only 9% of the Traditional Investor-period issues are made
under the Rule 144A regime, the percentage of Rule 144A issues in-
creases to 85% in the Arbitrage period. In the Post-Lehman period
this percentage drops back to approximately one-third of all offer-
ings (34%). We also ﬁnd a sharp increase in the percentage of offer-
ings for which the announcement and issue date coincide from the
Arbitrage period onwards. This ﬁnding can be attributed to the ra-
pid placement of recent convertibles, which is in turn caused by
the increase in the importance of Rule 144A offerings and by the
very fast buying decisions of convertible arbitrage funds (Dong
et al., 2012). During the Traditional Investor period, underpricing
is signiﬁcantly higher than during the Arbitrage period. However,
Arbitrage-period convertibles are still substantially underpriced,
thus offering ample proﬁt potential for convertible arbitrageurs.
Post-Lehman offerings, in turn, are offered at discounts that are
more than twice as large as underpricing levels during the Arbi-
trage period. One possible explanation for this ﬁnding is that, dur-
ing the Global Financial Crisis, issuers that are unable to obtain
standard ﬁnancing sources use convertible bonds as a last-resort
ﬁnancing type. These high underpricing levels may be necessary
to convince risk-averse investors to include convertibles in their
portfolios.
Finally, most of the macroeconomic variables are also signiﬁ-
cantly different across the three periods. For example, we ﬁnd that
market volatility is signiﬁcantly higher inthe Post-Lehman period
than in preceding periods. Together, the descriptive results pre-
sented in Table 2 highlight the need to control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc, is-
sue-speciﬁc, and macroeconomic ﬁnancing costs measures when
analyzing the source of the differences in abnormal stock returns
between the three periods.
Table 2
Summary statistics for potential determinants of stock returns around convertible bond announcements.
Variable Traditional Investor period
(N = 727)
Arbitrage period (N = 645) Post-Lehman period (N = 64) Kruskal–Wallis p-
value
t-test for difference in
means
Average Median Std.
Dev.
Average Median Std.
Dev.
Average Median Std.
Dev.
Issuer-speciﬁc
StockRunup 0.171 0.151 0.214 0.172 0.130 0.275 0.314 0.251 0.493 0.015 b,c
Slack 0.142 0.067 0.173 0.229 0.142 0.236 0.151 0.092 0.188 0.000 a,c
Tax 0.030 0.025 0.033 0.019 0.012 0.035 0.012 0.006 0.051 0.000 a,b
LTDebt 0.214 0.201 0.167 0.214 0.207 0.183 0.283 0.284 0.194 0.000 b,c
RelVolatility 3.744 3.128 2.435 3.246 3.039 1.419 4.480 4.968 2.515 0.000 a,c
MarkettoBook 3.419 2.350 5.628 4.460 2.710 6.395 2.266 1.487 3.496 0.000 a,b,c
FixedAssets 0.334 0.290 0.217 0.250 0.165 0.228 0.332 0.219 0.274 0.000 a,c
LogAssets 5.433 5.319 1.514 4.460 2.710 6.395 6.398 6.987 1.716 0.000 a,b,c
Issue-speciﬁc
CreditRating 11.874 13.000 2.856 10.117 9.000 2.387 9.400 9.000 1.330 0.000 a,b,c
Proceeds 0.400 0.289 0.424 0.359 0.224 0.462 0.129 0.078 0.132 0.000 b,c
ConvPremium 22.185 22.000 7.478 32.721 30.010 13.903 22.709 25.000 8.330 0.000 a,c
Maturity 16.704 15.240 7.444 14.877 20.095 8.942 6.945 5.033 5.426 0.000 a,b,c
144A 9.491% 84.651% 34.375% a,b,c
Issue = Announcement 25.722% 88.372% 95.313% a,b
Underpricing 0.215 0.219 0.090 0.157 0.150 0.131 0.342 0.340 0.102 0.000 a,b,c
Macroeconomic
InterestRate 4.919 4.650 1.471 1.836 1.943 0.974 3.643 3.274 1.177 0.000 a,b,c
TermSpread 2.023 1.900 0.963 1.653 1.853 1.300 2.906 2.827 0.374 0.000 a,b,c
MarketRunup 0.058 0.057 0.059 0.019 0.024 0.070 0.041 0.055 0.136 0.000 a
MarketVolatility 0.132 0.130 0.036 0.160 0.159 0.059 0.312 0.353 0.105 0.000 a,b,c
This table provides descriptive statistics for issuer-speciﬁc, issue-speciﬁc, and macroeconomic variables across periods. Variables are deﬁned as outlined in Appendix A and C.
The Traditional Investor period ranges from 1/1/1984 to 31/12/1999 and refers to the period before the surge in convertible arbitrage hedge funds. The Arbitrage period
ranges from 1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008 and refers to the period when convertible arbitrageurs were the predominant purchasers of convertible debt issues. The Post-Lehman
period ranges from 15/9/2008 to 31/12/2009 and refers to the period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. We use a Kruskal–Wallis test to jointly examine the
differences in each issuer- and issue-speciﬁc characteristic between all three sub-periods. In the last column, the letter ‘‘a’’ indicates a signiﬁcant difference between the
Traditional Investor period and the Arbitrage period, ‘‘b’’ indicates a signiﬁcant difference between the Traditional Investor period and the Post-Lehman period, and ‘‘c’’
indicates a signiﬁcant difference between the Arbitrage period and the Post-Lehman period. We use an independent sample t-test (assuming unequal variances) to examine
the equality of means across any two sub-periods for continuous variables, and a v2-test to examine the equality of proportions across any two sub-periods for dummy
variables (i.e., 144A and Issue = Announcement). N denotes the number of observations.
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4.1. Convertible debt, seasoned equity, and straight debt
announcement returns
Wemeasure abnormal stock returns by applying standard event
study methodology as outlined in Brown and Warner (1985). We
use the return over the CRSP equally-weighted market index as a
proxy for the market return, and estimate the market model over
the window (240,40) relative to the announcement date. In line
with most existing event studies, we measure cumulative
announcement-period stock returns (CARs) over the window (1,
1) relative to the security offering announcement date. We assume
that the public announcement of convertible debt offerings hap-
pens on the ﬁling date obtained from SDC.12 However, this date is
only available for publicly-placed convertible bond issues. For the
remainder of the convertibles (754 in total), we manually look up
the announcement date in Factiva. For seasoned equity offerings,
we identify the announcement date as the ﬁling date stated by
SDC (available for virtually all of the offerings). For publicly-placed
straight debt offerings, we also use the ﬁling date. For straight debt
issues for which the ﬁling date is not available due to the fact that
they are either structured as Rule 144A offerings or privately placed
(60% of the sample), we use the issue date obtained from SDC. Our12 We manually cross-check the accuracy of the ﬁling dates by verifying the actua
announcement dates obtained from Factiva for 100 convertible bond issues. The
results of this check indicate that SDC ﬁling dates are accurate. However, some of the
announcements are time-stamped after the closure of the stock market, which is why
we also include day +1 in our analysis of convertible debt announcement returns.lﬁndings remain similar when we exclude the straight debt issues for
which we have no ﬁling date available from the analysis. Table 3 pro-
vides the results of the event study analysis for the three security
types.
During the Traditional Investor period, security offering
announcement effects are similar in magnitude to those docu-
mented in prior studies (see, e.g., Eckbo et al., 2007). This is no sur-
prise since most prior event studies on security offerings also focus
on issues made prior to 2000. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we
ﬁnd that convertible bond announcement stock returns are signif-
icantly more negative during the Arbitrage period than during the
Traditional Investor period (4.59% compared with 1.69%), while
equity and straight debt announcement stock returns remain fairly
stable. However, inconsistent with Hypothesis 1, we ﬁnd that Post-
Lehman-period convertible bond announcement effects are signif-
icantly more negative than those in the previous two periods
(9.12%). Equity announcement stock returns are also slightly
more negative over this period (3.21%), but the magnitude of
the change is much smaller than that for convertibles. Kruskal–
Wallis p-values conﬁrm that there are substantial differences in
abnormal stock returns around convertible bond announcements
across the three periods (the p-value for differences in convertible
bond wealth effects across the three periods is smaller than 0.001),
while there are no such differences for equity and bond announce-
ment-period stock returns.
Fig. 2 visualizes the evolution in security offering announce-
ment effects over our research period by plotting quarterly average
shareholder wealth effects for each of the three security types. The
observed patterns are similar to those discussed in the context of
Table 3. While equity and straight debt offering announcement
effects remain fairly constant (except for a decrease in equity
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convertible debt announcement-period stock returns exhibit a
declining trend. Returns drop sharply as of the beginning of the
Arbitrage period, and fall even further at the beginning of the
Post-Lehman period.4 Calamos (2003) notes that convertible arbitrage has been used since the 19th
ntury.
5 It is important to note that none of the Post-Lehman offerings in our sample were
sued during the SEC’s short-sale ban. This ban ranged from September 19, 2008 until
ctober 9, 2008 and mainly affected ﬁnancial stocks (see Grundy et al., forthcoming).
6 Inconsistent with this interpretation, the coefﬁcient on the PostLehmanPeriod
ummy variable in Column (4) (in which we control for underpricing) is not much4.2. Determinants of convertible debt announcement returns
In the next step of the empirical analysis, we test whether the
evolutions in convertible debt announcement returns documented
in Table 3 and Fig. 2 can be attributed to changes in the convertible
bond investor base, as predicted by Hypothesis 2. Table 4 reports
the results of regression speciﬁcations with the CAR over the win-
dow (1, 1) relative to the convertible bond announcement date as
the dependent variable.
Column (1) includes a dummy variable equal to one for convert-
ibles issued during the Arbitrage period, and a dummy variable
equal to one for convertibles issued during the Post-Lehman peri-
od. Both variables have signiﬁcantly negative regression coefﬁ-
cients. In line with the univariate test results, we ﬁnd that the
differences between the periods are large in economic terms. The
abnormal return in the Arbitrage Period is 283 basis points lower
than in the Traditional Investor period, and the abnormal return
in the Post-Lehman period is 716 basis points lower than in the
Traditional Investor period.
In Column (2), we extend the regression with the control vari-
ables speciﬁed earlier. The inclusion of these variables results in
a substantial increase in the adjusted R2, from 7.40% to 10.35%.
As expected, CARs are negatively inﬂuenced by long-term debt
and issuer stock return volatility.13 CARs are signiﬁcantly positively
inﬂuenced by the market-to-book ratio, which is consistent with
results reported by De Jong et al. (2011).
In line with our predictions, we also ﬁnd that abnormal returns
are signiﬁcantly negatively inﬂuenced by the Issuance =
Announcement dummy variable, term spreads, and market return
volatility. The only ﬁnding that is inconsistent with our predictions
is the signiﬁcant positive impact of interest rates.
Most importantly, the coefﬁcients of the ArbPeriod and Post
LehmanPeriod dummy variables remain signiﬁcantly negative
when controlling for issue, issuer, and macroeconomic characteris-
tics. However, the magnitude of the coefﬁcients for both periods
drops to approximately 60% of their size in Column (1). Thus, part
of the more negative announcement returns for convertibles issued
during the Arbitrage and Post-Lehman periods seems to be caused
by the fact that these offerings have higher values (compared with
Traditional Investor-period offerings) on characteristics that nega-
tively affect convertible bond announcement returns. For example,
as documented in Table 2, the Post-Lehman period is characterized
by high issuer volatility, a high percentage of offerings with over-
lapping issue and announcement dates, and high market volatility.
All of these characteristics turn out to have a signiﬁcant negative
impact on convertible bond announcement returns in Column (2)
of Table 4.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the differences in convertible bond
announcement returns between the three periods should no longer
be signiﬁcant after controlling for differences in arbitrage-related
short selling. In Column (3), we test this prediction by including
the variable ArbDemand/SO, which captures the predicted hedging
demand from convertible arbitrageurs. We interact this variable
with each of the three period dummy variables. The interaction
term of ArbDemand/SO with the ArbPeriod dummy variable has
a strongly signiﬁcant negative impact on convertible debt13 Our ﬁnding on issuer stock return volatility is consistent with Liu and Switzer
(2009), who ﬁnd a negative impact of ﬁrm risk measures on stock price reactions to
convertible debt announcements.announcement returns, which corroborates the importance of arbi-
trage-induced short selling during the Arbitrage period. The inter-
action terms of ArbDemand/SO with the two other period dummy
variables also have a signiﬁcant negative impact, but with much
smaller coefﬁcient sizes than for the ArbDemand/SO  ArbPeriod
interaction term. This pattern is consistent with the notion that
convertible arbitrageurs are also active during the Traditional
Investor and Post-Lehman periods, albeit to a lesser extent than
during the Arbitrage period.14 Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the
coefﬁcient on the ArbPeriod dummy variable is no longer signiﬁ-
cantly negative after controlling for arbitrage-induced short selling.
In fact, the dummy’s coefﬁcient is now positive, albeit not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. We also ﬁnd that the PostLehmanPeriod dummy
variable is no longer signiﬁcant after controlling for arbitrage-in-
duced short selling. Our results thus suggest that arbitrage-induced
short selling during the Global Financial Crisis was still substantial
enough to explain the announcement return differences between
Traditional Investor- and Post-Lehman-period convertibles. Appar-
ently, the convertible issues made during the Crisis attracted consid-
erable interest from the remaining hedge funds in the market.15
Slack capital now has a signiﬁcant negative impact, while it was pre-
viously not signiﬁcant, and long-term debt, market-to-book, and the
Issue = Announcement dummy are no longer signiﬁcant. The ﬁnd-
ings with respect to the other control variables remain largely unaf-
fected by the inclusion of the ArbDemand/SO interaction terms.
The remaining regression speciﬁcations in Table 4 serve to test
the robustness of the results in Column (3). Column (4) includes
convertible debt underpricing as an additional control variable.
Due to the limited availability of some of the input variables
needed to calculate underpricing, we can only estimate this regres-
sion from 1991 onwards. As expected, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant nega-
tive impact of underpricing on announcement returns. Thus, the
extremely high underpricing levels of Post-Lehman convertible
offerings may also contribute to their highly negative announce-
ment returns.16 The other regression results are largely similar to
those in Column (3).
Column (5) includes interaction terms based on DeltaNeutral/
SO as a measure of arbitrage-induced short selling for a given con-
vertible. Using DeltaNeutral instead of ArbDemand provides a
more direct measure of the impact of the amount of shares sold
short on convertible bond announcement returns. Consistent with
the ﬁndings in Column (3), we ﬁnd that the interaction term be-
tween DeltaNeutral/SO and the ArbPeriod dummy variable has a
highly signiﬁcant negative impact. Also similar to Column (3),
the ArbPeriod dummy variable is not signiﬁcant when controlling
for this interaction term. The coefﬁcient of the interaction term
indicates that a 1% point increase in the amount of shares sold
short relative to shares outstanding leads to a 0.278% points de-
crease in convertible bond announcement returns. However, in
contrast with the ﬁndings in Column (3), the interaction term of
DeltaNeutral/SO with the PostLehmanPeriod dummy does not
have a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient, and the PostLehmanPeriod dummy
variable coefﬁcient remains signiﬁcantly negative when control-
ling for arbitrage-induced short selling. One explanation for this
divergence in the results is that DeltaNeutral does not take into
account other issue and issuer characteristics signiﬁcantly affect-ifferent from that in Column (3) (in which we do not control for underpricing).
owever, it is important to note that the regression in Column (4) is only estimated
r a subset of the data set (issues made from 1991 onwards), so that the coefﬁcients
re not directly comparable.1
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1
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Table 3
Univariate analysis of stock returns around convertible debt, seasoned equity, and straight debt announcements.
Variable Traditional Investor Period Arbitrage period Post-Lehman period Kruskal–Wallis p-value
Average Std. Dev Average Std. Dev Average Std. Dev
CARsCD (1, 1) 1.691%*** 5.074% 4.587%*** 7.200% 9.116%*** 9.405% 0.000
N 727 645 64
CARsEQ (1, 1) 2.343%*** 6.125% 2.665%*** 7.676% 3.218%*** 11.668% 0.272
N 3579 1143 163
CARsSD (1, 1) 0.094%* 3.668% 0.037% 3.993% 0.404%** 5.939% 0.061
N 5662 2692 380
This table shows average cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) measured over the window (1, 1) relative to the announcement date for samples of convertible debt,
seasoned equity, and straight debt offerings, as well as the standard deviation (std. dev) of these returns. CARs are calculated using standard event study methodology.
CARsCD are the CARs of convertible debt issuers. CARsEQ are the CARs of seasoned equity issuers. CARsSD are the CARs of straight debt issuers. The Traditional Investor period
ranges from 1/1/1984 to 31/12/1999 and refers to the period before the surge in convertible arbitrage hedge funds. The Arbitrage period ranges from 1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008
and refers to the period when convertible arbitrageurs were the predominant purchasers of convertible debt issues. The Post-Lehman period ranges from 15/9/2008 to 31/12/
2009 and refers to the period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. We use a Patell Z-test to examine whether individual CARs are equal to zero.
We use a Kruskal–Wallis test to jointly examine differences between the CARs across all three sub-periods. N denotes the number of observations.
* Signiﬁcance of the Patell Z-test statistic at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance of the Patell Z-test statistic at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance of the Patell Z-test statistic at the 1% level.
E. Duca et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (2012) 2884–2899 2893ing hedging demand (i.e., illiquidity and the percentage of institu-
tional ownership), and may as such be a less accurate measure for
arbitrage interest in a given offering than ArbDemand.
Columns (6) and (7) replicate the analysis in Column (3) but as-
sume that arbitrageurs follow, respectively, a bearish gamma and a
bullish gamma hedging strategy instead of a delta-neutral hedging
strategy. This analysis involves recalculating ArbDemand using the
coefﬁcients from Columns (3) and (4) of Panel B, Table 1, respec-
tively. The ﬁndings are virtually similar to those in Column (3).
Fabozzi et al. (2009) ﬁnd that the strong increase in conversion
premia as of the year 2000 acts as a substantial driver of hedge
fund returns. To examine whether changes in conversion premia
over the three periods affect our ﬁndings, Column (8) includes
interaction terms of the conversion premium with the ArbPeriod
and PostLehmanPeriod dummy variables. We ﬁnd that these inter-
action terms are not signiﬁcant. Their inclusion leaves our other-10%
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Fig. 2. Average quarterly stockholder wealth effects of convertible, seasoned equity, a
abnormal stock returns (CARs) for security offering announcements between Januar
announcement over the window (1, 1) relative to the announcement date using
announcements made in the same quarter. We take the moving average of four quar
convertible debt issuers. CARsEQ are the CARs of seasoned equity issuers. CARsSD are the
to 31/12/1999 and refers to the period before the surge in convertible arbitrage hedge fun
when convertible arbitrageurs were the predominant purchasers of convertible debt issu
period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers.ﬁndings virtually unaltered. Overall, the ﬁndings in Table 4 provide
strong evidence for Hypothesis 2.
4.3. Stock returns following convertible bond offerings
To examine Hypothesis 3, we calculate CARs over the extended
windows (2, 5) and (2, 10) following convertible bond issue dates.
The length of the windows is motivated by earlier studies showing
that stock price reversals following arbitrage-related supply shocks
tend to occur very fast (Harris and Gurel, 1986; Mitchell et al.,
2004). Moreover, using longer windows would introduce too much
noise in the abnormal return estimates (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya,
2002). Table 5 reports the results of this analysis.
Panel A provides a univariate comparison of the stock returns
following convertible offerings in the three periods. In line with
our arbitrage explanation for the highly negative stock price effects6
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
CARsEQ CARsSD
Arbitrage period
Post-
Lehman
period
nd straight debt announcements. This ﬁgure shows average quarterly cumulative
y 1984 and December 2009. We calculate abnormal returns for each security
standard event study methodology, and then average across security offering
ters to smooth the time series of announcement effects. CARsCD are the CARs of
CARs of straight debt issuers. The Traditional Investor period ranges from 1/1/1984
ds. The Arbitrage period ranges from 1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008 and refers to the period
es. The Post-Lehman period ranges from 15/9/2008 to 31/12/2009 and refers to the
Table 4
Regression analysis of determinants of convertible debt announcement returns.
Variable Parameter estimate (t-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ArbPeriod 2.830*** 1.630** 1.263 0.479 1.304 1.273 1.255 0.936
(8.30) (2.36) (1.27) (0.35) (1.51) (1.28) (1.26) (0.68)
PostLehmanPeriod 7.160*** 4.273*** 2.852 3.045 4.408*** 2.928 2.793 3.722
(6.25) (2.98) (1.58) (1.03) (2.97) (1.64) (1.54) (0.71)
Issuer-speciﬁc
StockRunup 0.150 0.855 1.091 0.651 0.855 0.853 0.742
(0.16) (0.85) (0.83) (0.67) (0.85) (0.85) (0.76)
Slack 1.438 2.593** 2.747* 1.741 2.587** 2.597** 2.584**
(1.22) (2.09) (1.75) (1.46) (2.09) (2.10) (2.12)
Tax 1.674 0.673 1.954 0.810 0.606 0.725 0.072
(0.27) (0.11) (0.22) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.01)
LTDebt 2.084* 0.527 0.822 0.674 0.542 0.518 0.594
(1.84) (0.43) (0.51) (0.58) (0.44) (0.42) (0.48)
RelVolatility 0.314* 0.478*** 0.003 0.253 0.477*** 0.478*** 0.468***
(1.94) (2.74) (0.01) (1.58) (2.73) (2.74) (2.69)
MarkettoBook 0.065* 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
(1.81) (0.35) (0.02) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.34)
FixedAssets 0.201 0.219 0.202 0.303 0.208 0.227 0.220
(0.27) (0.28) (0.19) (0.40) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28)
LogAssets 0.353 0.186 0.469** 0.035 0.187 0.187 0.216
(0.36) (1.16) (2.04) (0.22) (1.17) (1.16) (1.38)
Issue-speciﬁc
CreditRating 0.045 0.081 0.051 0.025 0.081 0.082 0.082
(0.71) (1.16) (0.48) (0.39) (1.16) (1.17) (1.17)
Proceeds 0.315 1.030 1.392 0.541 1.025 1.034 1.085
(0.45) (1.40) (1.36) (0.81) (1.39) (1.40) (1.47)
ConvPremium 0.009 0.019 0.035* 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.019
(0.57) (1.25) (1.69) (1.41) (1.24) (1.25) (0.73)
ConvPremium  ArbPeriod 0.010
(0.33)
ConvPremium  PostLehmanPeriod 0.263
(1.46)
Maturity 0.002 0.027 0.054 0.007 0.026 0.028 0.030
(0.09) (1.20) (1.57) (0.31) (1.16) (1.24) (1.32)
144A 0.194 0.284 0.816 0.063 0.284 0.283 0.386
(0.35) (0.48) (1.18) (0.11) (0.48) (0.48) (0.66)
Issue = Announcement 0.828* 0.713 1.353* 0.718* 0.708 0.717 0.751*
(1.96) (1.60) (1.65) (1.69) (1.59) (1.61) (1.69)
Underpricing 5.836**
(2.38)
Macroeconomic
InterestRate 0.290** 0.308** 0.221 0.209 0.306** 0.310** 0.335**
(2.15) (2.22) (0.73) (1.55) (2.20) (2.23) (2.42)
TermSpread 0.362** 0.331** 0.213 0.256* 0.329** 0.332** 0.333**
(2.52) (2.23) (1.13) (1.77) (2.22) (2.23) (2.26)
MarketRunup 0.385 2.225 6.280 1.854 2.187 2.255 2.235
(0.13) (0.72) (1.47) (0.62) (0.70) (0.73) (0.72)
MarketVolatility 11.113*** 13.267*** 10.723* 11.154*** 13.250*** 12.278*** 14.727***
(2.84) (3.23) (1.80) (2.81) (3.22) (3.23) (3.51)
Arbitrage shorting
ArbDemand/SO  TradInvestorPeriod 27.691*** 53.438* 27.751*** 27.613*** 27.187**
(2.61) (1.77) (2.60) (2.60) (2.55)
ArbDemand/SO  ArbPeriod 171.074*** 160.746*** 172.352*** 169.990*** 168.701***
(5.03) (5.03) (5.10) (4.98) (4.94)
ArbDemand/SO  PostLehmanPeriod 82.158* 82.158* 78.478* 84.980* 98.463**
(1.69) (1.69) (1.66) (1.71) (2.42)
DeltaNeutral/SO  TradInvestorPeriod 2.316*
(1.75)
DeltaNeutral/SO  ArbPeriod 27.815***
(5.89)
DeltaNeutral/SO  PostLehmanPeriod 0.430
(0.33)
Intercept 1.689*** 1.738 0.709 0.418 1.101 0.696 0.713 0.572
(9.11) (0.88) (0.33) (0.14) (0.54) (0.33) (0.34) (0.28)
Adj. R2 7.40% 10.35% 13.12% 9.78% 13.41% 13.80% 13.12% 10.81%
N 1436 1436 1436 788 1436 1436 1436 1436
Period 1984–2009 1984–2009 1984–2009 1991–2009 1984–2009 1984–2009 1984–2009 1984–2009
This table presents the results of a regression analysis of announcement-period cumulative abnormal stock returns of convertible offerings on a number of potential
determinants. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal stock return measured over the window (1, 1) relative to the announcement date, calculated using
standard event study methodology. TradInvestorPeriod is a dummy variable equal to one for convertible bond offerings announced in the Traditional Investor period, which
ranges from 1/1/1984 to 31/12/1999, and equal to zero otherwise. ArbPeriod is a dummy variable equal to one for convertible bond offerings announced in the Arbitrage
period, which ranges from 1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008, and equal to zero otherwise. PostLehmanPeriod is a dummy variable equal to one for convertible bond offerings announced
during in the Post-Lehman period, which ranges from 15/9/2008 to 31/12/2009, and equal to zero otherwise. ArbDemand/SO is the estimated arbitrage-related increase in
short interest relative to shares outstanding, calculated for each convertible using the coefﬁcients from the regression in Column (1) of Table 1 in all Columns except Columns
(6) and (7). In Columns (6) and (7), ArbDemand/SO is calculated using the coefﬁcients from the regressions in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1, respectively. All other
explanatory variables are deﬁned as outlined in Appendix A, B, and C. t-statistics, calculated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in parentheses.
N denotes the number of observations.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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positive post-issuance stock returns for offerings made during this
period. The positive abnormal stock return of 0.54% over window
(2, 10) represents approximately 12% of the absolute value of the
announcement-period CAR (0.54/4.59). Thus, in line with previous
studies (Dhillon and Johnson, 1991; Mazzeo and Moore, 1992;
Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997; De Jong et al., 2011), our evidence
suggests that there is only a partial reversal of the negative impact
of the supply shock. However, it is hard to isolate the true magni-
tude of the reversal of the price pressure effect due to the fact that
the CAR (1, 1) simultaneously captures the effect of the signaling
Table 5
Analysis of stock returns, delta, and required short selling following convertible debt issu
Variable Traditional Investor period Arbitrage period
Average Std. Dev. Average St
Panel A: Univariate analysis of abnormal stock returns following convertible bond issuan
CARs (2, 5) 0.023% 5.257% 0.503%*** 6.
CARs (2, 10) 0.459%** 8.253% 0.541%*** 8.
N 727 645
Panel B: Regression analysis of abnormal stock returns following convertible bond issuan
ArbDemand/SO  TradInvestorPeriod
ArbDemand/SO  ArbPeriod
ArbDemand/SO  PostLehmanPeriod
Amihud
Intercept
Adj. R2
N
Period
Trading
day
Delta DeltaNe
Average daily
increase (1)
Average absolute
change (2)
Average daily
increase (3)
Average
day-0 v
Panel C: Average daily changes in delta and DeltaNeutral following convertible bond issu
1 0.00050 0.00214 10,642 0.07
2 0.00016 0.00281 1371 0.07
3 0.00025 0.00224 694 0.03
4 0.00032 0.00227 6172 0.02
5 0.00004 0.00215 3963 0.02
6 0.00020 0.00230 809 0.05
7 0.00016 0.00224 5303 0.07
8 0.00021 0.00209 5870 0.09
9 0.00008 0.00235 982 0.11
10 0.00023 0.00230 2438 0.16
This table analyses abnormal stock returns as well as changes in delta and in required
convertible bond issuance. Trading days are measured relative to the convertible bond iss
convertible bond issues, calculated using standard event study methodology. The Tradit
before the surge in convertible arbitrage hedge funds. The Arbitrage period ranges from
the predominant purchasers of convertible debt issues. The Post-Lehman period ranges
Lehman Brothers. Panel A present average CARs over the windows (2, 5) and (2, 10), as w
whether individual CARs are equal to zero. We use a Kruskal–Wallis test to jointly exam
results of a regression analysis of the CARs over the windows (2, 5) and (2, 10) on a num
for convertible bond offerings announced in the Traditional Investor period, and equal t
offerings announced in the Arbitrage period, and equal to zero otherwise. PostLehmanP
during in the Post-Lehman period, and equal to zero otherwise. ArbDemand/SO is the e
calculated for each convertible using the coefﬁcients from the regression in Column (1) of
Appendix A. t-statistics, estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standa
N denotes the number of observations. Panel C presents changes in deltas and required
days following the convertible bond issue date. Delta and DeltaNeutral are calculated as o
respect to its previous day value. Column (2) provides the average absolute change in d
change in DeltaNeutral (as a result of the change in delta) with respect to its previous da
the issue date, as a percentage of the value of DeltaNeutral on the issue date. Column (5
date, as a percentage of the value of DeltaNeutral on the issue date.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.content of the convertibles and the effect of price pressure result-
ing from arbitrage trading.
By contrast, we ﬁnd no evidence of a positive stock price rever-
sal in the Traditional Investor and Post-Lehman periods. In fact,
abnormal stock returns over the window (2, 10) are signiﬁcantly
negative during both periods. The ﬁnding of negative post-issuance
returns is consistent with Lewis et al. (2001), who report long-run
stock price underperformance following convertible debt issuance
over longer investment horizons.
In Panel B, we regress post-issuance stock returns on our mea-
sure for arbitrage-related increases in short interest. This regres-es.
Post-Lehman period Kruskal–Wallis p-value
d. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
ce
112% 1.848% 11.516% 0.000
793% 3.391%* 11.492% 0.000
64
Parameter estimate (t-value)
CARs (2, 5) (1) CARs (2, 10) (2)
ce
0.766 2.199
(0.07) (0.13)
41.310*** 50.975*
(2.32) (1.88)
33.241 41.913
(0.82) (0.95)
0.050 0.070
(0.48) (0.33)
0.243 0.515
(0.75) (1.07)
0.76% 0.49%
1436 1436
1984–2009 1984–2009
utral
cumulative increase as % of
alue (4) (%)
Average cumulative absolute change as % of
day-0 value (5) (%)
ance
0.29
0.57
0.69
0.79
0.86
0.95
0.98
1.00
1.08
1.16
arbitrage-related short selling (as captured by DeltaNeutral) in the days following
ue date. Panels A and B present cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) following
ional Investor period ranges from 1/1/1984 to 31/12/1999 and refers to the period
1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008 and refers to the period when convertible arbitrageurs were
from 15/9/2008 to 31/12/2009 and refers to the period following the collapse of
ell as standard deviations (std. dev) of these CARs. We use a Patell Z-test to examine
ine differences between the CARs across all three sub-periods. Panel B presents the
ber of potential determinants. TradInvestorPeriod is a dummy variable equal to one
o zero otherwise. ArbPeriod is a dummy variable equal to one for convertible bond
eriod is a dummy variable equal to one for convertible bond offerings announced
stimated arbitrage-related increase in short interest relative to shares outstanding,
Table 1. Amihud captures illiquidity of the issuer stock and is deﬁned as outlined in
rd errors, are in parentheses.
short selling for achieving a delta-neutral position (DeltaNeutral) in the ten trading
utlined in Appendix B. Column (1) provides the average daily increase in delta with
elta with respect to its previous day value. Column (3) provides the average daily
y value. Column (4) provides the average cumulative increase in DeltaNeutral since
) provides the average cumulative absolute change in DeltaNeutral since the issue
2896 E. Duca et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (2012) 2884–2899sion analysis helps us verify whether the positive stock price rever-
sal recorded for Arbitrage-period convertibles can effectively be
attributed to the market absorption of arbitrage-induced short
sales. If this is the case, then we should observe a larger stock price
reversal for Arbitrage-period convertibles with higher hedging de-
mand by convertible arbitrageurs, as captured by the ArbDemand/
SO measure. Next to the interaction terms of the ArbDemand var-
iable with the three period dummies, the regression also includes
an Amihud illiquidity measure, since price reversals are expected
to be stronger for more illiquid stocks (Bagwell, 1992).
Consistent with the arbitrage explanation for post-issuance
reversals in the Arbitrage-period announcement returns, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant positive impact of the ArbDemand/SO  ArbPeriod inter-
action term over both windows. By contrast, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
impactof the corresponding interaction termsduring theTraditional
Investor andPost-Lehmanperiods. ConsistentwithHypothesis3,we
thusobtain strongerevidenceofpositive stockprice reversalsduring
years with higher involvement of convertible arbitrage funds. Our
ﬁndingsare robust to calculatingArbPeriodassumingabearishgam-
ma or bullish gamma instead of a delta-neutral hedging strategy.
When stock prices increase, convertible bond deltas increase,
resulting in larger required short positions (and vice versa for stock
price decreases). To verify the potential impact of convertible arbit-
rageurs’ portfolio rebalancing actions on our results, Panel C of Table
5presents average changes in convertible debt deltas and associated
changes in required short positions (as captured by DeltaNeutral)
over trading days one to ten following issuance. Column (1) reports
the increase in delta relative to the previous trading day. At the start
of day +1 following issuance, average deltas have slightly decreased
relative to issue-date deltas due to issue-date stock price decreases.
Overall, the daily changes indelta are very small. Since largedelta in-
creases for some ﬁrms could be masked by large delta decreases for
other ﬁrms, Column (2) provides the average absolute changes in
delta. We ﬁnd that these changes are also minor.
Columns (3) to (5)providemore insight into the required changes
in shares shorted to preserve a delta-neutral hedging position,
assuming daily rebalancing of the portfolio. Given the small changes
indelta, it is not surprising thatpost-issuance changes in thenumber
of shares to be shorted are marginal. The short positions need to be
reducedbyonly10,642shares at the start of tradingday+1 following
issuance, correspondingwith amere 0.07% of the averageDeltaNeu-
tral position on the issue date. The required changes in shares
shorted over subsequent trading days are even smaller. Column (4)
shows that the average cumulative increase in requiredshort selling,
as apercentageof the issue-dateDeltaNeutral position, is only0.16%.
Column (5) indicates that considering absolute changes in required
short selling leads to similar conclusions. Overall, Panel C shows that
post-issuance changes in deltas and required delta-neutral shorting
positions are very small compared with the initial establishment of
the short position on the issue date.17 Under typical rebalancing
thresholds such as the ones suggestedby Fabozzi et al. (2009) (i.e., del-
ta change tolerances between 0.02 and 0.3), we would observe even
smaller changes in short positions.5. Conclusion
Over the past decades, the convertible bond market has experi-
enced a substantial shift in its buyer base. In this paper, we show
that this shift has important implications for the stockholder
wealth effects registered around convertible bond announcements.
In the Traditional Investor period, which ranges from 1984 to 1999
and is dominated by long-only investors, average convertible debt
announcement effects are 1.69%. In the Arbitrage period, which
17 Our ﬁndings remain similar when considering only Arbitrage-period issues
(untabulated).ranges from 2000 to September 2008 and is dominated by convert-
ible arbitrage hedge funds, average convertible debt announce-
ment effects drop to 4.59%. We hypothesize that this sharp
decrease can be attributed to price pressure resulting from the
hedging transactions of convertible arbitrageurs. Consistent with
this hypothesis, we ﬁnd that the differences between Traditional
Investor- and Arbitrage-period announcement returns are no long-
er signiﬁcant after controlling for arbitrage-induced short selling.
This result is robust to assuming a range of arbitrage strategies
and arbitrage-induced short selling measures.
For convertibles issued after the Lehman Brothers collapse in
September 2008, we ﬁnd even more negative average announce-
ment effects of 9.12%. Our evidence indicates that these highly
negative stock price reactions can partly be explained by arbi-
trage-induced price pressure. Although the Global Financial Crisis
sparked a decrease in hedge fund capital available for convertible
debt investment, our ﬁndings suggest that the convertibles issued
during the Crisis are still heavily taken up by the remaining con-
vertible arbitrage funds. Moreover, Post-Lehman offerings have
certain characteristics (e.g., high issuer and market volatility, and
very high offering underpricing) that further depress convertible
bond announcement returns.
An interesting question is why ﬁrms have continued to issue
convertible securities during periods dominated by convertible
arbitrage funds as investors, given the negative impact of these
arbitrageurs’ short-selling actions on issuer stock prices. Our anal-
ysis of post-issuance abnormal stock returns suggests that the
prospect of incurring announcement-period price pressure may
not be an important deterrent of convertible bond issuance, since
part of the price pressure is reversed quickly after issuance. More-
over, as shown by Brown et al. (2010), hedge funds can act as rel-
atively low-cost distributors of equity exposure for ﬁrms with high
costs of raising seasoned equity. Firms may trade-off these lower
issuance costs with the prospect of arbitrage-induced price pres-
sure when deciding between ﬁnancing types.Acknowledgements
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speciﬁc, and macroeconomic variables included in the analysis
This Appendix provides a deﬁnition of the explanatory variables
used in the paper, listed in alphabetical order. Issue characteristics
are obtained from SDC. Balance sheet and income statement vari-
ables are obtained from Compustat Fundamentals Annual and
measured at the ﬁscal year end preceding the convertible bond
announcement date, unless noted otherwise. # indicates a Compu-
stat Fundamentals Annual data item. Stock price data are obtained
Variable name Classiﬁcation Calculation
144A Issue-speciﬁc Dummy variable that takes the value one for offerings made under SEC Rule 144A
Amihud Issuer-speciﬁc Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, calculated as the ratio of the absolute value of daily stock returns divided by trading volumes averaged over the window
(120, 20). For expositional purposes, we multiply this ratio by 106
CAFactiva Macroeconomic Number of news sources in Factiva mentioning ‘‘convertible arbitrage’’ or a related search term (as outlined in Fig. 1), calculated over the quarter preceding the
convertible bond announcement date
CAFlows Macroeconomic Flows into convertible arbitrage hedge funds over the quarter prior to the convertible bond issuance quarter. We obtain data on ﬂows into convertible bond
arbitrage hedge funds from the TASS Live and Graveyard databases, which provide coverage from 1994 onwards. We select those funds that state convertible
arbitrage as their primary investment category and that have a US-oriented geographical focus (164 in total). We measure hedge fund ﬂows in a similar way as
Choi et al. (2010). First, we calculate dollar ﬂows for each fund using the change in total net assets over the quarter, adjusted for the returns of the fund. We then
aggregate ﬂows and total net assets across funds for each quarter and divide the change in total ﬂows by total lagged assets to obtain percentage quarterly fund
ﬂows
ConvPremium Issue-speciﬁc Conversion premium of the convertible, expressed as a percentage. It is calculated by dividing the conversion price by the stock price measured on trading day
5, and subtracting one from this ratio
CreditRating Issue-speciﬁc Moody’s credit rating of the convertible at the moment of issuance. Consistent with Chan and Chen (2007), we assign a value of one to Moody’s Aaa ratings and
add a value of one to each subsequent rating. If the convertible has no Moody’s rating but is rated by Standard and Poor’s, we convert the S&P rating into the
equivalent Moody’s rating. In line with Loncarski et al. (2009), we assign a rating of Baa2 to unrated convertibles
Delta Issue-speciﬁc Sensitivity of the convertible bond value to its underlying common stock value, measured as outlined in Appendix B
DeltaNeutral/SO Issue-speciﬁc Number of shares that need to be shorted for arbitrageurs to obtain a delta-neutral position as of the issue date, calculated as outlined in Appendix B, divided by
the number of shares outstanding measured on trading day 20
DividendPaying Issuer-speciﬁc Dummy variable equal to one if the convertible bond issuer paid out a dividend over the previous ﬁscal year, which can be established through #26
FixedAssets Issuer-speciﬁc Plant, property, and equipment (#8) divided by total assets (#6)
Gamma Issue-speciﬁc Sensitivity of the convertible bond delta to its underlying common stock value, measured as outlined in Appendix B
GammaBear/SO Issue-speciﬁc Number of shares that need to be shorted for arbitrageurs to obtain a bearish gamma hedge as of the issue date, calculated as outlined in Appendix B, divided by
the number of shares outstanding measured on trading day 20
GammaBull/SO Issue-speciﬁc Number of shares that need to be shorted for arbitrageurs to obtain a bullish gamma hedge as of the issue date, calculated as outlined in Appendix B, divided by
the number of shares outstanding measured on trading day 20
InstitOwnership Issuer-speciﬁc Number of shares held by 13F institutions (obtained from Thomson Reuters), divided by the number of shares outstanding (both measured at the ﬁscal year-end
prior to the convertible bond announcement date)
InterestRate Macroeconomic Difference between yields on 10-year US Treasury Bonds and the inﬂation rate (measured as the continuously-compounded annual change in the US Consumer
Price Index), averaged over the quarter prior to issuance
Issue=Announcement Issue-speciﬁc Dummy variable that takes the value one when the issue date and announcement date coincide, or when the issue date falls one trading day after the
announcement date
LogAssets Issuer-speciﬁc Natural logarithm of total assets (#6), deﬂated by the Consumer Price Index (obtained from Datastream)
LTDebt Issuer-speciﬁc Long-term debt (#9) divided by total assets (#6)
MarketRunup Macroeconomic Return on the S&P 500 index over the quarter prior to issuance
MarkettoBook Issuer-speciﬁc Market value (calculated as #25 multiplied by #199) divided by the book value of common equity (#60)
MarketVolatility Macroeconomic Annualized market return volatility, calculated from daily returns on the S&P 500 index over the quarter prior to issuance
Maturity Issue-speciﬁc Convertible bond maturity, measured as of the issue date
Proceeds Issue-speciﬁc Relative size of the convertible bond offering, calculated as the offering proceeds divided by total assets (#6)
RelVolatility Issuer-speciﬁc Annualized stock return volatility, estimated from daily stock returns over the window (240, 40) relative to the convertible bond announcement date, divided
by the annualized standard deviation of the S&P 500 index (obtained from Datastream) calculated over the same period
Slack Issuer-speciﬁc Cash and short-term investments (#1) divided by total assets (#6)
StockRunup Issuer-speciﬁc Stock return over the window (60, 2) relative to the announcement date
Tax Issuer-speciﬁc Income taxes paid (#16) divided by total assets (#6)
TermSpread Macroeconomic Difference between yields on 10-year US Treasury Bonds and 3-month Treasury Bills, averaged over the quarter prior to issuance
Underpricing Issue-speciﬁc Underpricing of the convertible bond as of its issue date, measured as outlined in Appendix C
Volatility Issuer-speciﬁc Annualized stock return volatility, estimated from daily stock returns over the window (240, 40) relative to the convertible bond announcement date
ZeroCoupon Issue-speciﬁc Dummy variable equal to one for zero-coupon convertibles
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9 We assign a rating of Baa2 to unrated convertibles, as in Loncarski et al. (2009).
0 Since Datastream discontinues the provision of credit spreads as of the end of
008, we construct our own credit spread estimates for convertibles issued in 2009. In
009, 95% of our sample offerings are unrated (and thus classiﬁed as Baa2-rated
2898 E. Duca et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (2012) 2884–2899from CRSP. Trading days are measured relative to the convertible
bond announcement date. Macroeconomic characteristics are ob-
tained from Datastream, unless noted otherwise.
Appendix B. Calculation of DeltaNeutral, GammaBear, and
GammaBull
DeltaNeutral represents the number of shares expected to be
shorted by arbitrageurs, under the assumption that arbitrageurs
follow a delta-neutral hedging strategy. In line with De Jong
et al. (2011), we calculate this variable as follows:
DeltaNeutral ¼ number of convertibles issued face value delta
conversion price
ð1Þ
We calculate the number of convertibles issued by dividing the
offering proceeds by the face value of the convertible (both
obtained from SDC). Delta represents the sensitivity of the convert-
ible bond value to its underlying common stock value. In line with
Burlacu (2000), Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2007), and Loncarski
et al. (2009), we calculate delta as follows:
Delta ¼ edTNðd1Þ ¼ edTN
ln SX
 þ r  dþ r22
 
T
r
ﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
8<
:
9=
;; ð2Þ
with d the continuously-compounded dividend yield (obtained
from Compustat Fundamentals Annual by dividing #26 by #199),
N(.) the cumulative probability under a standard normal distribu-
tion, S the stock price on trading day 5 relative to the announce-
ment date (obtained from CRSP), X the conversion price (obtained
from SDC), r the yield on a 10-year US Treasury Bond measured
on the issue date (obtained from CRSP), r the stock return Volatility,
and T the convertible bond Maturity (both measured as outlined in
Appendix A).18
Arbitrageurs may also exploit the convertible’s gamma to ob-
tain incremental proﬁts. Gamma measures the sensitivity of the
convertible’s delta to underlying stock price movements. In line
with Fabozzi et al. (2009), we calculate gamma as:
Gamma ¼ edTN0ðd1Þ ¼ edT
u ln
S
Xð Þþ rdþr22
 
T
r
ﬃﬃ
T
p
 
Sr
ﬃﬃﬃ
T
p ; ð3Þ
with u the probability distribution function of the standard normal
distribution, and all other parameters deﬁned as in the context of
Eq. (2). Consistent with Fabozzi et al. (2009), we consider a bearish
gamma strategy in which arbitrageurs buy the convertible and
short-sell delta plus 0.09, and a bullish gamma strategy in which
they buy the convertible and short-sell delta minus 0.09. We calcu-
late GammaBear and GammaBull values using Eq. (1), but replacing
delta with delta plus 0.09 and delta minus 0.09, respectively.
Appendix C. Calculation of convertible debt underpricing at
issuance
In line with Chan and Chen (2007) and De Jong et al. (2011), we
deﬁne initial underpricing as the difference between the convert-
ible bond’s theoretical price and the bond’s issue price, divided18 As argued in Zabolotnyuk et al. (2010), a potential disadvantage of delta is that it
does not capture convertibility and callability characteristics. As such, delta provides
an incomplete measure for the equity component size of convertibles. However, the
purpose of the delta measure included in the DeltaNeutral variable is to replicate the
inputs that are actually used by arbitrageurs in their hedging strategy. Calamos
(2003) argues that arbitrageurs base their hedging on a delta measure analogous to
the one deﬁned in Eq. (2), so we conclude that it is appropriate to use this measure as
an input in DeltaNeutral.by the bond’s theoretical price. We obtain the issue price from
SDC. To calculate the theoretical convertible bond price, we use
the Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998) model, which is widely used
in other studies on convertible bond underpricing (Ammann et al.,
2003; Chan and Chen, 2007; Loncarski et al., 2009; De Jong et al.,
2011). As pointed out by Zabolotnyuk et al. (2010), the method is
also popular among practitioners.
Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998) use a binomial-tree approach to
model the stock price process and decompose the total valueof a con-
vertible bond into an equity component and a straight debt compo-
nent. We use the following input variables in the model (all
measured as of the convertible bond issue date, unless otherwise
mentioned): yield on US government bonds of which the maturity
most closelymatches thematurity of the convertible bond (obtained
fromCRSP);Moody’s credit ratings or equivalent Standard and Poor’s
ratings converted to a Moody’s rating (obtained from SDC)19; credit
spreads of similarly-rated corporate straight debt (obtained fromData-
stream)20; conversion ratios and call schedules; dividend yield for the
ﬁscal year preceding the announcement date (obtained from Compu-
stat Fundamentals Annual by dividing #26 by #199), price of the
underlying stock averaged between trading days 12 and 2 prior to
the announcement date; and Volatility calculated as outlined in
Appendix A.References
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